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The Bizarre Law & Economics of
Business Roundtable v. SEC
Grant M. Hayden*
Matthew T. Bodie**

INTRODUCTION
Corporate shareholders elect their boards of directors.1 They
do not, however, use anything like a conventional ballot. Instead,
shareholders fill out a “proxy ballot” delivered to them by the
incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent
board’s chosen nominees, very often the same board members
themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose
another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other
shareholders with a separate proxy ballot.2
Throughout the last decade, the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC) has been at work developing a rule for
allowing shareholders to have access to the corporate proxy ballot.3
In 2010, the agency finally passed Rule 14a-11, which would have
required corporations to put shareholder-nominated candidates on
the company’s own proxy ballot (as long as certain conditions
were met).4 The 2010 rule was the culmination of a process that
included two previous incarnations, as well as legislation that
specifically paved the way for the rule’s creation.5 Less than a
year after its passage, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit struck down the law, holding that the SEC violated
*

Professor and John DeWitt Gregory Research Scholar, Hofstra Law School.
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1
See, e.g., DEL.	
   CODE	
   ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.21
(2007).
2
See, e.g., DEL.	
  CODE	
  ANN. tit. 8, § 215; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (2007).
3
For a discussion of these proposals, see Part I infra.
4
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). The regulation was formerly
codified as Rule 14a-11. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2010), vacated by
Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The
Commission recognized the vacation of the rule in Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 76 Fed. Reg. 58100 (Sept. 20, 2011).
5
See Part I infra.
**

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115495

2

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to consider the rule’s
costs and benefits adequately.6 According to the Court, the SEC’s
failure was so egregious that the Commission’s decision to
promulgate Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious.”7
Other commentators have noted that the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion rests on an extremely muscular version of judicial
review—one that contravenes the traditional deference to
administrative authority.8 Our concern, however, is with the
court’s misapplication of law and economics principles. The
court’s reasoning in Business Roundtable rests on flawed empirical
and theoretical conclusions about proxy access and corporate
governance. It ignores the benefits of facilitating shareholder
democracy and focuses instead on costs that are routine for any
functioning electoral system. As a result, its decision to strike
down the regulation rests on a version of law and economics that
contravenes the discipline’s traditional principles and exacerbates
agency costs.
Rule 14a-11 is open to debate on grounds of policy.9 But the
Business Roundtable decision improperly sides with management
by casting one side in the shareholder democracy debate as
“arbitrary and capricious.” It is, in fact, the court’s opinion that
uses economic and voting-rights principles in a capricious manner.
In Part I, we provide a brief overview of Rule 14a-11 and the
Business Roundtable decision. In Part II, we discuss the basic
theory of voting rights and apply them to the shareholder franchise.
In Part III, we discuss how the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the
dynamics of shareholder voting and the role of Rule 14a-11 in the
process. Finally, in part IV we discuss the larger problem
exemplified by the Business Roundtable decision—namely, the
growing preference amongst some law and economics
6

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d, at 1146.
Id. at 1156.
8
See, e.g., Case Comment, Administrative Law—Corporate Governance
Regulation—D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and
Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1093, 1095 (2012) (concluding that the court “applied
an excessively exhausting standard that all but bars contested reforms”); Steven
M. Davidoff, Proxy Access in Limbo After Court Rules Against It, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, July 27, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/proxyaccess-in-limbo-after-court-rules-against-it/ (noting that “the opinion appears to
create an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it
provide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective”).
9
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61
EMORY L.J. 435, 439 (2012) (characterizing the rule as “a largely ineffective
tool for shareholder nomination of directors”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1432 (2011)
(arguing that proxy access rules, in whatever form, are not “likely to be very
important”).
7
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commentators for a Potemkin-Village version of shareholder
democracy, one that undermines the very market principles that
they purport to advance.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS, FROM 1942
TO BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE V. SEC
The SEC’s proxy access rule was not a lark; it was not a
quick-draw policy change that came out of the darkness. Allowing
shareholders direct access to the board’s proxy ballot is, in many
ways, an intuitive step. The proxy ballot is designed to look like
an actual ballot—an instrument for casting one’s vote in the
election of directors. However, the proxy ballot is in fact simply
an instruction to the board as to how one’s shares should be voted
at the annual meeting. The board decides the nominees to be
placed on its own ballot and oversees its distribution. It is much
more akin to a letter or request to the board, made on a form that
the board has provided for that purpose, as to how the
shareholder’s shares should be voted at the meeting.10 It is not a
ballot. The actual election is conducted at the shareholders’
meeting, and the proxy ballots are used to give the board that
shareholder’s proxy votes. If the shareholder was personally
appearing at the meeting, she could votes her shares in person and
would have no need for a proxy. For those who are absent, the
company’s proxy ballot is a way for the incumbent board to
facilitate votes—but on the board’s own terms. Thus, in order to
run against the incumbent board and/or the board’s designated
replacements, an “insurgent” candidate must provide her own
proxy ballots for distribution. If the shareholder is voting with the
board, she turns in the board’s proxy; if voting for the opposition,
either the shareholder must show up and vote directly or she must
provide her proxy to the opposition’s designee.
Because we are used to voting using a designated ballot, it is
natural to confuse the proxy ballot with an actual one. This
confusion is perhaps at the heart of the proxy access debates. Over
time, the proxy ballot has been coopted by the government for
various purposes. The proxy is generally accompanied by massive
disclosures required by federal law; it includes votes over
compensation packages and audit providers; and it provides
shareholder access for independent referenda on questions relating

10

For examples of proxy ballots, see SEC, Spotlight on Proxy Matters—
Receiving
Proxy
Materials,
at:
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/proxy_materials.shtml (last visited
April 3, 2012).
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to a variety of potential subjects.11 The ballots are generally sent
(via mail or the web) to an accounting or proxy firm, which
collects and counts the proxies, much like an independent election.
Because of these accoutrements, the proxy ballot looks a lot more
like a part of an independent electoral process rather than a request
to the board to vote for the board’s nominees as provided on a
board form.
Less than a decade after the passage of the Securities Act of
1933, the SEC first considered proxy access for shareholders.12
The proposal—debated internally—provided that “stockholders be
permitted to use the management’s proxy statement to canvass
stockholders generally for the election of their own nominees for
directorships, as well as for the nominees of the management.”13
Shareholders would have only been permitted to add an additional
nominee for each seat; thus, the company could stop adding
nominees once they were twice the number of positions.14 The
Commission did not formally act upon the idea.15
Proxy access came up for consideration again in 1977 and
1992. In 1977, the SEC deferred on access in favor of supporting
the work of board nominating committees; the Commission
intended for these committees to consider shareholder candidates
as well.16 And in 1992, the Commission opted to expand Rule
14a-417 to allow shareholders to include board nominees on their
“short-slate” proxy ballots.18 This reform made it easier for
11

For a list of the excluded subject areas for proxy proposals, see Rule 14a-8(i),
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18(j) (2011).
12
SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942)
[hereinafter 1942 SEC Release].
13
See Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1943)
(testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell), cited in STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REP., REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS
REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 3 (2003), available
at, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2003 SEC
PROXY REPORT].
14
Id.
15
See 1942 SEC Release, supra note 12.
16
2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. However, there were no
formal requirements that the committees actually place dissident candidates on
the ballot.
17
Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2011).
18
2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. A “short slate” is a group of
dissident directors that falls short of the number of open seats. Id. The change
in Rule 14a-4 allowed shareholders to single out a certain number of board
nominees for inclusion on the shareholders’ proxy ballots, even if the nominees
did not want to be included. As an example, directors B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5
are running for reelection. If shareholders want to nominate S1 and S2 to run
against B1 and B2, the shareholders can submit a proxy with S1, S2, B3, B4,
and B5, in order to isolate B1 and B2, even if B3, B4, and B5 do not want to be
on the shareholders’ proxies.
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shareholders to seek minority representation on the board by
targeting certain board nominees out of management’s entire
slate.19
Over the past decade, however, the SEC has pursued proxy
access in earnest. The Commission proposed proxy access rules in
2003 as part of a broader suite of pro-shareholder reforms. Under
the 2003 proposal, proxy access hinged on a “triggering event”:
either a vote on a special Rule 14a-8 proposal subjecting the
company to proxy access, or a thirty-five percent or more
“withhold” vote for one of the company’s directors.20 Once
triggered, shareholder with at least five percent of the voting
securities, held for at least two years, would be entitled to
nominate between one and three director candidates.21 The
proposal received numerous comments but, in the end, was never
acted upon.22
Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 to create
proxy access for shareholder director candidates was improperly

19

Id.
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,789-90
(Oct. 23, 2003). The Rule 14a-8 proposal would have to have been submitted
by a shareholder with at least one percent beneficial ownership for at least one
year. Id. at 60,790.
21
Id. at 60,794-98. The formula for number of nominees was as follows:
20

As proposed, a company would be required to include one
security holder nominee if the total number of members of the
board of directors is eight or fewer, two security holder
nominees if the number of members of the board of directors
is greater than eight and less than 20 and three security holder
nominees if the number of members of the board of directors
is 20 or more. The proposal would have a separate standard
for companies with classified or “staggered” boards of
directors. Where a company has a director (or directors)
currently serving on its board of directors who was elected as
a security holder nominee, and the term of that director
extends past the date of the meeting of security holders for
which the company is soliciting proxies, the company would
not be required to include on its proxy card more security
holder nominees than could result in the total number of
directors serving on the board that were elected as security
holder nominees being greater than one if the total number of
members of the board of directors is eight or fewer, two if the
number of members of the board of directors is greater than
eight and less than 20 and three if the number of members of
the board of directors is 20 or more.
Id. at 60,797-98.
22
Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1354.
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excluded from a company’s proxy materials.23 The SEC had sided
with the company, arguing that the proposal related to an election
and was therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8).24 However,
the court held that the exclusion only referred to proposals
concerning a particular election, not those concerning procedural
rules that apply to elections in general.25 The AFSCME decision
led to a period of some confusion in the proxy world, as the court
had rejected the SEC’s interpretation of its own rule. Thus, the
SEC either would be stuck with the Second Circuit’s decision or
would have to change the rule.
The Commission, confronted with this legal fork in the road,
essentially chose to explore both directions at once. In 2007 it
released for comment two alternative proposals: a “shareholder
access” proposal and a “status quo” proposal. Under the access
proposal, the SEC would change Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow
shareholders to submit proposals amending corporation bylaws
that would give proxy access to shareholder nominees.26 Only
shareholders owning greater than 5% of a company’s voting
securities would be permitted to make proposals in the proxy
materials affecting director nomination and election procedures.27
The access proposal would allow such shareholders to offer
whatever shareholder nomination procedures they desired in the
proxy materials.28 The only substantive limitations on such
procedures would be those imposed by state law or the company’s
charter and bylaws.29 The status quo proposal was a codification
of the SEC’s interpretation prior to the Second Circuit’s
overturning.30 The effect of the status quo proposal would be to
reverse the Second Circuit’s decision in AFSCME and continue to
23

AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id. at 123 (discussing previous version of Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which allowed
companies to exclude a shareholder proposal under 14a-8 that “relates to an
election”).
25
Id. at 130.
26
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (Aug. 3, 2007).
27
Id. at 43,472. In addition, to be eligible shareholders could not have acquired
or held their securities for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or
influencing the control of the company and also had to meet the requirements of
Schedule 13G. Any shareholder wishing to circumvent the rule would have to
follow the SEC’s other disclosure requirements for hostile takeovers and similar
actions. Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. The actual form and substance of the proposed bylaw amendments by the
shareholders would still be governed by the corporation or state law, and the
SEC would only intervene regarding the procedures of proposing such a bylaw
and the disclosure requirements.
30
Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg.
43488 (Aug. 3, 2007).
24
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permit corporations to exclude from proxy materials shareholder
proposals that would affect the director nomination and election
procedures.31 Ultimately, the SEC adopted the status quo proposal
in a divided 3-2 vote.32
In 2009, the SEC released yet another iteration of proxy
access. This version created a new rule—Rule14a-11—that would
provide for direct access to the ballot for shareholders.33 The 2009
proposal significantly reduced the requirements for participation.
Only 1% ownership was necessary for companies with over $700
million in assets, sliding up to 3% for those with assets between
$75 million and $700 million, and 5% for those under $75
million.34 The period for holding the securities was only one year,
and a triggering event was no longer necessary.35
Most
significantly, the proposal would have made this access a
mandatory part of the corporate structure, rather than merely
allowing shareholders to implement it on their own.
The SEC received comments on the proposal up through 2010,
when the Dodd-Frank Act specifically gave the Commission the
authority to enact proxy access reforms.36 Soon thereafter, the
Commission adopted Rule 14a-11 on a 3-2 vote.37 The final rule
increased the ownership requirements to 3% but allowed
shareholders to pool their holdings to reach that threshold. That 3%
had to be held for three years prior to the nominations and up
through the actual shareholder meeting. Shareholders were limited
to nominating candidates for up to 25% of the seats on the board,
and they could not intend a change in control.38 In addition, the
Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to propose
proxy nomination processes within their individual corporations.39
31

Id. at 43,493.
Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1355.
33
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9,046, Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18, 2009).
34
Id. at 29,035.
35
Id. at 29,032, 29,035.
36
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 971(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (“The
Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a shareholder of proxy
solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of securities for the purpose of
nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer,
under such terms and conditions as the Commission determines are in the
interests of shareholders and for the protection of investors.”).
37
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9,136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
38
Id.
39
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2012). The revised Rule 14a-8 only excludes
proposals that “(i) Would disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; (ii)
32
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A little over a month after the rule was adopted, the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce filed a petition with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit seeking an injunction
against the new rule.40 The SEC stayed the rule pending judicial
review.41 On July 22, 2011, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act42 for failing
“adequately to consider the new rule’s effect upon efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”43
The court based its ruling on three failures on the part of the
Commission. First, the court found that the SEC failed to calculate
the costs and the benefits of the new rule properly, specifically
with respect to the incumbent board’s costs of opposing a
shareholder nominee. According to the court, “the Commission
failed to appreciate the intensity with which issuers would oppose
nominees and arbitrarily dismissed the probability that directors
would conclude their fiduciary duties required them to support
their own nominees.”44 The court also criticized the Commission’s
“mixed empirical evidence” on the benefits of proxy access, and
claimed that the agency had misapplied state law as an excuse for
ignoring certain costs.45 The second failure was the SEC’s neglect
of the strategic uses of the rule for union and state pension fund
shareholders. The court found “there was good reason to believe
institutional investors with special interests will be able to use the
rule” to advance their “self-interested objectives rather than the
goal of maximizing shareholder value.”46 Finally, as to the third
failure, the court accused the Commission of emphasizing the
infrequency of elections when assessing the costs, but not when
Would remove a director from office before his or her term expired; (iii)
Questions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more
nominees or directors; (iv) Seeks to include a specific individual in the
company's proxy materials for election to the board of directors; or (v)
Otherwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors.” Id.
40
Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2010 WL 3770710, at *2 (D.C.
Cir.).
41
See Order Granting Stay In re Motion of Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act
Release No. 9,149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act
Release
No.
29,456
(Oct.
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9149.pdf.
42
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006).
43
Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146. See also id. at 1148 (“The petitioners
argue the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously here because it
neglected its statutory responsibility to determine the likely economic
consequences of Rule 14a–11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. . . . We agree with the petitioners and hold
the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again .
. . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule.”).
44
Id. at 1149.
45
Id. at 1151.
46
Id. at 1152.
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assessing the benefits. According to the court, “the Commission's
discussion of the estimated frequency of nominations under Rule
14a–11 is internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary.”47
The D.C. Circuit’s decision striking down Rule 14a-11
surprised many observers, including opponents of the rule.48 In
fact, it seems fair to say that most academic commentators were
quite critical of the opinion.49 Much of the commentary focused
on the level of review called for under the statute—“arbitrary and
capricious”—when compared with the regulation’s actual flaws as
found by the court. This article, however, is not about the
application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the SEC’s
proxy access regulation. Instead, it concerns the court’s economic
and voting-rights analysis supporting its decision to strike the
regulation down. Before turning to that critique, we provide a
brief overview of shareholder democracy, in theory and practice.
II. SHAREHOLDERS, DEMOCRACY, AND CORPORATE LAW

47

Id. at 1153.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Proxy Access Invalidated on APA Grounds,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM,
(July
22,
2011),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/07/proxyaccess-invalidated-on-apa-grounds.html (“Candidly, while I’m pleased, I’m also
surprised. I had thought—and said publicly—that I thought this suit was a long
shot.”).
49
Case Comment, supra note 8 (saying that the opinion “made missteps similar
to those for which [it] scolded the SEC,” and called it “troubling”); Davidoff,
supra note 8 (noting that “the opinion appears to create an almost
insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical
support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective”); Brett McDonnell,
Dodd-Frank @1: An Overall Assessment, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG, (July 22,
2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/dodd-frank-1-an-overallassessment.html (“This opinion is little more than the judges ignoring the
proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in notice-and-comment
rulemaking and asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk about
judicial activism.”); Gordon Smith, Comment to Gordon Smith, Business
Roundtable v. SEC, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG, (July 22, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-vsec.html#comment-261374058 (“I had told my students that I thought the
lawsuit was not well-founded, so I was surprised by the opinion. I understand
why people would oppose proxy access, but ‘arbitrary and capricious’? The
process hardly seems to qualify for that characterization. . . . I am not enamored
with the result here.”); David Zaring, More on the DC Circuit’s Proxy Access
Decision,
THE
CONGLOMERATE
BLOG,
(Aug.
4,
2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/08/the-dc-circuits-proxy-access-decisionkeeps-getting-attention-see-here-for-a-roundup-and-here-from-elliott-spitzerseem.html (saying that the court’s analysis is “probably best characterized as
fly-specking, and the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive,” and
that “the opinion isn’t very good”).
48

10
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All institutions, including business corporations, must make
decisions. These decisions often involve judgments about the
needs and desires of a wide variety of constituents. There are
many ways to move from these individual preferences to
institutional choices. And most of the institutions that comprise
modern market economies—from governments to small
businesses—employ a range of decisionmaking structures designed
to take account of their constituents’ preferences. They sometimes
rely upon contracts, which are thought to ensure the preference
satisfaction of everyone involved.50 But once institutions reach a
certain size and complexity, contracts alone can’t do the job. At
that point, the institutions resort to some sort of voting mechanism
to translate individual preferences into institutional choices.
A. Governments
Democratic political institutions, of course, rely heavily on
voting mechanisms to translate preferences into social choices;
indeed, the ability of its constituents to cast a meaningful vote is
what makes a government “democratic.” But when political
institutions settle on voting as the preferred method of preference
aggregation, they still have many decisions to make about how to
structure the process. Those decisions often come to be embodied
in a set of legal entitlements, or voting rights, which collectively
sketch the contours of polity. Voting rights, though, are not
unidimensional; instead, there are many distinct facets to the rights
to vote, each of which is necessary to ensuring full democratic
participation.51
The first aspect of the right involves access—the ability to
cast a ballot.52 This is voting rights at its most fundamental. At
50

See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, The Cult of Efficiency in
Corporate Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 244-45 (2010).
51
Pam Karlan sets up a taxonomy of three aspects of the right to vote in Pamela
S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989).
See also Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589, 1594-1602 (2004) [hereinafter Dilemma] (giving a brief
account of the history of each aspect of the right). Other ways of parsing out the
right to vote, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right is “The Right to
Vote”?, 93 VA. L. REV. 43 (2007); Pamela S.Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993), are not
inconsistent with this conception. Here, we take Karlan’s taxonomy as a starting
point and add the slating process into the mix.
52
For a relatively recent history of the right to vote, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR,
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2000). For information about voting in the early years of the republic,
see MARCHETTE G. CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO
VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960).
For
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the beginning of the country’s history, most states only extended
the franchise to property-holding white men over the age of
twenty-one.53 That, of course, has changed, and many more
groups have access to the ballot.54 There are, however, some
restrictions that remain: most jurisdictions restrict voting by felons
or ex-felons,55 noncitizens,56 and nonresidents.57 Minors and
people with certain mental impairments are also not allowed to
vote.58 But, although we are far from universal suffrage, a greater
proportion of the population can vote now than could at the
country’s founding.
In a sense, the question of “who” should have a right to vote
is relatively straightforward. The debate is essentially over which
groups should be considered members of the polity whose
information about voting rights in more recent years, with an emphasis on the
quest for minority representation, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman eds. 1994); BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD NIEMI,
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992);
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 19441969 (1976); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880-1910 (1974).
53
See KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at tbls. 1-3, for a list of the property and
taxpaying requirements in the colonies and states between 1776 and 1855.
54
African Americans and other racial minorities initially secured voting rights
through a series of constitutional amendments. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII
(abolishing slavery), XIV (granting national citizenship and rights of due
process and equal protection) & XV (prohibiting voting rights discrimination on
the basis of race). For a discussion of passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, see
WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 93-104. Those
protections were lost as a result of Sothern resistance and Northern indifference,
see KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 107, 111-16; KOUSSER, supra note 51,;
GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 5-10; Hayden, supra note 51, at 1595, but
largely restored with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-1973bb-1 (2000); see GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 52; LAWSON, supra
note 51, at 10. On passage of the Voting Rights Act, see LAWSON, supra note
52, at 288-328; KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 262-64. Women secured access to
the polls in 1920 through the Nineteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX,
and eighteen- to twenty-year olds through the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
55
See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation,
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004).
56
See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,
Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1391, 1397-1418, 1460-67 (1993).
57
See Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-Vote:
Better Results from the Voting Rights Act? 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1996)
(explaining that, in the 1960s, residency became “the sole proxy for electoral
interest. Residency – and, in most cases, residency alone – became the standard
for granting suffrage to qualified potential voters.”).
58
See KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 287-88.
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preferences should be reflected in electoral outcomes. The issue
becomes more complicated once we move from “who” votes to
“how” they vote. It does so because the mechanics of most
election procedures—things like registration requirements, voting
methods, and vote counting—may themselves restrict the right to
vote, but in more subtle ways that depend upon whether the
procedures have disproportionate effect on some voter-relevant
group.59 For example, if a state requires voters to produce
photographic identification in order to vote, and large numbers of,
say, poor people lack such identification, then that may skew the
outcome of the election.60 In a sense, then, both who has a right to
vote and how they vote, can affect access to the electoral system.
Mere access to the polls, though, guarantees very little,
especially in a representative democracy.61 To begin with, votes
may end up carrying different numerical weights.62 Sometimes, as
in weighted voting systems, this is part of the design. The
International Monetary Fund, for example, assigns different
numbers of votes to each member country.63 In other cases, votes
are weighted differently as a result of deliberate indifference to
underlying demographic changes. In the first half of the twentieth
century, many states refused to redraw district lines in the face of

59

See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (noting that “[e]ach
provision of these [state election codes], whether it governs the registration and
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting
process itself, inevitably affects -- at least to some degree -- the individual's right
to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends”); Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313 (2007) (explaining the sliding scale
of scrutiny applied to election codes).
60
See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1365-66
(N.D. Ga. 2005).
61
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the
False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 451
(2008) [hereinafter False Promise].
62
For background on this aspect of the right to vote, see STEPHEN
ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE
PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008);
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITICS (1968); REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION:
LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Robert A. Goldwin
ed., 1968); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION:
REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966);
ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION (1965); Hayden, Dilemma, supra note 50; Grant M. Hayden,
The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003)
[hereinafter One Person].
63
See Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF
Board
of
Governors,
(Mar.
15,
2012),
at:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm.
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tremendous demographic changes.64 This had the effect of diluting
the numerical voting power of those in more populous (largely
urban) districts and concentrating it in the less populous (rural)
districts,65 a situation remedied by the Supreme Court’s one
person, one vote decisions in the 1960s.66 The ability to cast a
meaningful vote, though, can clearly be inhibited by either denying
access to the polls or by numerically diluting one’s vote.
Democratic political entities take many factors into
consideration when making decisions about voting access and
weight. Chief among these, though, is some assessment of a
voter’s interest in the political entity—what they have at stake in
the outcome of the election.67 Those with a strong interest in the
outcome are prime candidates for the franchise; those with little or
nothing riding on it are rarely extended voting rights. Given that
voting mechanisms are primarily a method of aggregating
individual preferences, it makes some sense to start with those who
actually have strong feelings on the matters at issue.68 They may
also make better informed decisions and help ensure that the
election outcome is viewed as legitimate.69
Because political entities have no way of directly measuring
the strength of one’s preferences, they usually rely upon proxies
for voter interest.70 In the past, states relied upon property-holding
and taxpaying requirements to ensure that those voting had a
sufficient economic stake in the outcome of an election.71 While
such restrictions now strike us as antiquated, and even
discriminatory, we nonetheless still believe in the underlying
assumption that voting should be tied to interest. We just think we
have better proxies. Residency requirements, for example, allow
us to target people living within the borders of a government
whose power is, to a great degree, geographically circumscribed:
those people within the borders are those with a greater stake in the
outcome of elections.72 And this connection between voter access
and voter interest has even been endorsed by the Supreme Court.73

64

See Hayden, One Person, supra note 62, at 219.
See id.
66
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
67
See Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 452-60.
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See id. at 453.
69
See id.
70
See id. at 460-62.
71
See id. at 454, 460.
72
See id. at 454-55, 460.
73
See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 & n.15 (1969); Hayden & Bodie,
False Promise, supra note 61, at 455-56.
65
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Political entities also attend to voter interest when assigning
weights to votes. In weighted voting systems, the weight is often
assigned in proportion to the voter’s perceived stake in the
enterprise. In the IMF, a member’s voting power is largely
determined by the resources it contributes to the fund.74 Other
types of voting systems follow suite, though sometimes in ways
that aren’t as obvious. Take, for example, the one person, one vote
requirement. The U.S. Constitution requires that districting for
the House of Representatives, both houses of state legislatures, and
local governmental entities be done in a way that assigns equal
numerical weight to votes.75 The requirement may involve a
positive judgment that all are equally interested in the outcome of
an election; more likely, it reflects our inability to make such finely
tuned assessments of the strength of people’s preferences.76 In any
case, though, an exception to the one person, one vote
requirements—special purpose districts--may help prove the
relationship between voter interest and voting weight. The
governing boards of special purpose districts are allowed to restrict
the franchise to those most affected by its decisions and then
further fine-tune voting weight with that interest.77 Water boards,
for example, are allowed to restrict voting to landowners and,
further, weight the votes according to how much land each voter
owns.78 This one acre, one vote system is thought to more
accurately tailor voter interest with voting weight.
The ability to cast an equally weighted vote, however, does
not guarantee an equal opportunity to participate. There are a
variety of other ways to keep like-minded voters from electing
candidates of their choice. Some of these manipulate the ways in
which votes are combined. At-large elections, anti-single-shot
laws, and gerrymanders have all been used to dilute the voting
power of certain groups.79 Gerrymandering district boundaries, for
example, can take groups that could constitute an effective
majority in one district and split them into two districts so they’re a
majority in neither.80 The legal status of attempts to dilute a
74

See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 63.
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (House of Representatives);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislatures); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-81 (1968) (local governments).
76
See Hayden, One Person, supra note 62, at 251-52.
77
See id. at 252-55.
78
See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973) (water district not subject to usual one person, one vote
requirements); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (same).
79
See BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD NIEMI, MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 23-24 (1992).
80
See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative
Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, 86-99 (Chandler Davidson
ed., 1984). These strategies of “cracking” and “packing” voters are discussed in
75
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group’s voting power depends upon the type of group being
targeted. Racial minorities are afforded greater legal protection
than, say, members of a political party.81
The other way to keep groups from electing their preferred
candidates is to interfere with the slating process. This may be
done from the top down, by, say, prohibiting certain candidates
from running for or holding office. In the aftermath of the Civil
War, the federal government forced states to allow blacks to vote;
the state of Georgia immediately responded by passing a law that
prohibited blacks from holding office.82 One may also interfere
with group voting power from the bottom up, by limiting group
members’ access to earlier stages of the slating process. In the first
half of the twentieth century, southern states used the white
primary as a means of keeping black voters out of the primary
elections, eliminating their preferred candidates at that stage, and
then leaving them to choose between unpalatable alternatives in
the general election.83 The group in control of the slating process
can effectively control electoral outcomes.84
In the United States, the slating processes for federal, state,
and local offices, as well as those for state initiatives, are largely
controlled by the states. And, in addition to the historical attempts
to control black voting rights, states have used a variety of
techniques to limit ballot access. Most states have relied upon
filing fees and signature requirements, or some combination of the
two, to qualify for placement on the ballot.85 The filing fees
typically vary by office, are sometimes based upon some
percentage of the yearly salary for that office, and may sometimes
be waived, in whole or in part, with the submission of a certain
number of signatures.86 The signature requirements may be stated
either in absolute terms or calculated as a percentage of the voter
several Supreme Court opinions as well. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986).
81
Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny
when race is the predominant factor in districting) with Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004) (refusing to adjudicate a political gerrymandering claim).
82
See KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 86.
83
See generally DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS (2003).
84
This is also true for the less obvious reason that a group with agenda control
can take advantage of potential voting cycles and manipulate an agenda in a way
that favors its desired outcome. See Grant M. Hayden, Some Implications of
Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 312-313 (1995).
85
See Mark R. Brown, Popularizing Ballot Access: The Front Door to Election
Reform, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281, 1284-85 (1997).
86
See, e.g., Signature Requirements and Deadlines for 2012 State Legislative
Elections,
BALLOT*PEDIA
(March
15,
2012),
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Signature_requirements_and_deadlines_fo
r_2012_state_legislative_elections.

16

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

turnout in some recent election, usually a gubernatorial election.87
The barriers to entry are often designed in a way to be particularly
onerous for minority party and independent candidates.88
Ballot access restrictions are typically justified on two main
grounds. First by limiting the number of candidates or alternatives
on the ballot, the restrictions are thought to prevent voter
confusion.89 Second, ballot access laws are believed to promote
electoral stability by keeping frivolous candidates off the ballot or,
more to the point, preserving the two-party system.90 Other goals
include more tangential benefits, such as the government’s interest
in the revenue raised through filing fees.91
Restricting ballot access, however, comes at a real
democratic cost. As discussed above, elections are first and
foremost about preference aggregation. People’s preferences about
all sorts of things—from food to books to political candidates—
range widely, and any respectable system of preference
aggregation needs to account for that variation. (For that very
reason, one of the principles of democratic fairness in Arrow’s
Theorem is universal admissibility, which demands that a social
choice mechanism needs to be able to work with any possible
preference profile.)92 People’s preferences won’t be meaningfully
reflected in electoral outcomes if too many options are taken off
the table before voting even begins. To put it in more marketoriented terms—ballot access laws are government regulations that
stifle electoral competition.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has analyzed ballot
access as an integral component of the right to vote. In order to be
more than a procedural formality, the right to vote effectively must
be understood as the right to vote for a candidate of one’s own
choosing.93 This initially led the Court to view all ballot access
laws with great suspicion, subjecting them to strict scrutiny, which
required the state to justify any restriction as a necessary means to
a compelling governmental end.94 The Court devised and applied
that standard in the 1968 decision Williams v. Rhodes, striking
down an Ohio requirement that new party candidates had to submit
over 400,000 signatures by February of an election year.95
87

See id.
See Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive
Ballot Access Laws and the Decline of Electoral Competition in the United
States, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 421-24 (2005).
89
See id. at 420-21.
90
See id. at 420-24.
91
See Brown, supra note 85, at 1307.
92
See Hayden, supra note 84, at 298.
93
See Hall, supra note 88, at 425.
94
See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
95
See id. at 28-30; see also Hall, supra note 88, at 424-48.
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Since Williams, however, the Court has been less critical of
ballot access laws because, upon reflection, it turns out that the
mechanics of most state election procedures—including ballot
access and other things such as registration requirements, voting
methods, and vote counting—may, in some sense, restrict the right
to vote. And subjecting every one of these state requirements to
strict scrutiny seemed excessive. The Supreme Court avoided such
a result by fashioning a new method of analyzing constitutional
challenges to the mechanics of registration and voting. In Burdick
v. Takushi, the Court established a sliding scale where the degree
of judicial scrutiny given to a state requirement depends upon the
“character and magnitude” of its burden on voting rights.96 Where
the voting rights are subject to “severe” restrictions, something
akin to ordinary strict scrutiny is applied where the regulation must
be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance.”97 But in cases where the regulation imposes only
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon voting rights,
“‘the State’s important regulatory interest are generally sufficient
to justify’ the restrictions.”98 Thus, the unidimensional application
of strict scrutiny is moderated in recognition of the fact that all
election regulations have some effect on the right to vote.
Ballot access laws, then, are supposed to strike an appropriate
balance between maintaining electoral stability and preserving
meaningful choice. In effect, however, the move away from strict
scrutiny has given states quite a bit of leeway when it comes to
restricting access to the ballot. Minor party and independent
candidates oftentimes have a difficult time making it onto the
ballots, diminishing the range of options available to voters, and
leading some scholars to argue that ballot access laws are the most
anti-competitive feature of the American political system.99
***
Democratic political entities, then, devise voting systems
designed to produce group decisions that accurately reflect the
underlying individual preferences. They begin by indentifying
people with an interest in the polity and ensuring that they have
equal access to the voting system. Those votes are weighted
equally unless there’s some strong reason to suspect that people’s
levels of interest are unequal in a way that can be accurately
measured (as with special purpose districts). Once these individual
voting rights are secure, care must be taken to ensure that groups
96

504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
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See Hall, supra note 88, at 413-16.
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of like-minded individuals have an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice, something that can be frustrated in a
variety of ways in either the slating process or the vote aggregation
process. In the end, a democratic political system is designed
translate individual preferences into group choices without
skewing the result in any particular direction.
B. Corporations
While business corporations are very different from political
entities, they too confront the issue of translating individual
preferences into group choices.100 When we think of a corporation,
we generally picture a collection of people and assets with some
common commercial goal. In a legal sense, though, a corporation
is a fiction—an entity created by the government with no
independent existence. Thus, perhaps it’s more useful to conceive
of a corporation as a legal structure designed to allocate rights and
duties among a group of people devoted to some shared
enterprise.101
The group itself is a rather diverse set of
constituents, and may be said to include the many types of people
with an interest in the enterprise, including directors, officers,
shareholders, employees, bondholders, suppliers, and even
customers.
While there are a number of features considered essential to
the legal structure of a corporation,102 the keys to its
decisionmaking structure (and thus this paper) are shared
ownership by investors and delegated management.103 The three
players within this governance structure are the shareholders, the
board of directors, and the officers.104
The shareholders,
sometimes called the “owners” of the firm, have the right to
receive residual profits as well as the right to elect the board of
100

Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 460.
Corporations are not, of course, the only form of business organization—
there are sole proprietorships, partnerships, trusts, and an assortment of
variations of them. Corporations, though, are generally viewed as the most
complex business entitity, and the one that currently dominates the economic
activity in the United States.
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Scholars have isolated five factors which are considered essential to the
corporate form: (1) full legal personality, including the ability to bind the firm to
contracts; (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by
investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board structure; and (5)
transferable shares. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History
for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-440 (2001). Cf. ROBERT C. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) (listing four characteristics of the corporation: (1)
limited liability, (2) free transferability of investor interests, (3) legal
personality, and (4) centralized management).
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directors.105 The directors are, in turn, the locus of authority within
the corporation; they are the representatives of the firm when
human counterparts to the fictional form are required.106 The
board of directors, though, does not generally run the business;
directors usually delegate this power to the officers of the
corporation.
These officers in turn select the remaining
employees. The structure is hierarchical, in that shareholders can
vote out directors, directors can fire the officers, and officers can
fire the remaining employees.107
When looking at this structure in the context of political
institutions, we are immediately struck by the fact that it is only
shareholders who are having their preferences aggregated. The
corporation encompasses the daily activities of a variety of
different players: directors, officers, executives, management, and
employees.
Moreover, there are a variety of outside
“stakeholders” who have interests in the activities of the
corporation, akin to shareholders: bondholders, suppliers,
customers, even the community at large. However, when it comes
to aggregating the preferences of the polity, in order to determine
the leadership of the corporation, only shareholders are invited to
participate.
This structure looks like it runs against the basic prescription
in politics that all those with an interest in the enterprise should be
accorded voting rights. But the way corporations are structured is
thought to aggregate the preferences of all of all constituents in the
most efficient manner. Most corporate constituents, inside and
outside the corporation, have their preferences captured through
contracts that fix their entitlements.108 Employees, for example,
receive a certain wage for their labor; consumers buy the
company’s products at a certain price. These contracts are thought
to be the most straightforward way to capture the preferences since
all parties consenting to a contract prefer the state of affairs under
the contract.109 Thus, each contract is posited to be a Pareto
improvement.110 Shareholders have their entitlements fixed by
contract too, but among their entitlements is the right to elect the
board of directors (and, ultimately, control the firm).111
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This designation is something of a misnomer. See text accompanying notes
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CLARK, supra note 102, at 21.
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Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
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The primary justification for limiting voting rights to
shareholders is the theory of shareholder primacy.112 Shareholder
primacy is the theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for
such key concepts as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.113
Shareholder primacy essentially means that corporations exist to
serve the interests of shareholders.114 Put more specifically, the
theory mandates that the corporation be run with the goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth.
Shareholder primacy could simply be a democratic legitimacy
argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder interests at the
forefront, because shareholders are the voting polity. But this
leaves a critical question unanswered: who made the shareholders
the voting polity? The choice of this group as the voting “citizens”
of the polity is what needs justifying.115 A variant of this
justification is that shareholders are the corporation’s “owners” and
thus were entitled to the ownership rights of profits and control.116
However, the ownership justification is also doomed by its
circularity: who made the shareholders the “owners”?117 Labeling
shareholders “owners” is no more of a justification for the vote
than is labeling them “voters”.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel provided a justification
for shareholder primacy beyond simple labels. In looking to
ground shareholder primacy in economic theory, they looked to the
traditional economic utility rationale of creating the highest level
of efficiency or overall social utility.118 Shareholder primacy
theory argues that maximizing shareholder wealth will generate the
highest amount of surplus and thus will result in the greatest
overall social utility.119 Instead of being the “owners” of the
corporation, shareholders were one group of many whose contracts
with one another jointly created the fictional corporate “entity.”120
However, shareholders were the sole “residual claimants:” that is,
their returns were not payable until the other contractual
112

See id. at 569-71.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
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participants—creditors, employees, customers, suppliers—had
been fully satisfied.121 Because shareholders are not paid until
these set contractual payments have been made, all other claimants
received their contractual entitlements, and the shareholders
benefited from the maximization of the residual.
Control of corporate decisionmaking is, ultimately,
concentrated in the hands of the shareholders in order to maximize
the preference satisfaction of all involved. Shareholders, as the
residual claimants, are assigned what is left after all fixed claims
on corporate proceeds have been paid.122 Managers and directors
are assigned, by contract or statute, a fiduciary duty to shareholders
in order to make the residual attractive.123 And other parties can be
offered enough to keep them involved in the corporate
enterprise.124 Total proceeds are supposed to be higher if the
residual claims are assigned to one group.125 Shareholders get the
nod over other stakeholders in lieu of contractual claims because
that is the best way to induce them to put their money at risk while
also relinquishing any real control over how it is used.126 Again,
the result is a combination of managerial control (as expressed by
the business judgment rule) and shareholder interest (expressed by
charging the managers with maximizing shareholder wealth) that is
supposed to be a Pareto improvement over both direct shareholder
control and a system that tries to look out for all stakeholder
interests.127
This is why the “one share, one vote” rule is a “logical
consequence” of the theory of shareholder primacy.128 The “one
share, one vote” rule requires that each share of stock have equal
voting weight with all other shares. In this way, the voting interest
is equal to the interest in the residual. Shares with disproportionate
voting power create skewed incentives. As Easterbrook and
Fischel argue, “Those with disproportionate voting power will not
receive shares of the residual gains or loss from new endeavors and
121
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arrangements commensurate with their control; as a result, they
will not make optimal decisions.”129 As a result, those with control
will have the incentive to seek disproportionate gains that do not
directly inure to the owners of the residual.130 The residual will no
longer be maximized, discouraging equity investment and leading
to a decline in societal efficiency.
Thus, the theory of shareholder primacy rests on the notion
that shareholders will improve social welfare by focusing on
increasing the corporation’s residual profits. Shareholder primacy
is enforced through shareholder voting and by the market for
corporate control which uses the shareholder vote to effectuate
changes in management. Essential to the theory is the notion of
shareholder homogeneity: namely, that shareholders all have a
common, homogeneous interest in increasing residual profits.
Over the last several years, however, it has become clear that
shareholders are not, in fact, the homogeneous wealth maximizers
they were once thought to be. Instead, their interests diverge along
a number of dimensions.131 Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy have
recently focused attention upon the problems caused by equity
derivatives, which carve up various shareholder rights into discrete
financial securities.132 But there are many other ways in which
shareholders fail to share common interests. For example, some
shareholders may be in a control group, and others may not.133
Employee and pension-holding shareholders have different
interests from non-employee shareholders.134
Traditional
shareholders may have different time horizons for wealth
maximization that cannot be costlessly equalized through existing
financial instruments.135 And even when shareholder interests line
up and they agree on a definition of wealth maximization, they
129

Id. See also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) (“The case for the
one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic
incentives with voting power and to preserve the market for corporate control as
a check on bad management.”).
130
See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 851 (2006).
(discussing concerns that controlling shareholders without a commensurate
economic stake in the corporation are more likely to “tunnel” away a
disproportionate share of firm value).
131
See Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 477–99 (cataloguing
the ways in which shareholder interests diverge); Iman Anabtawi, Some
Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93
(2006) (same).
132
Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
775, 778–81; see also Hu & Black, supra note 130, at 815..
133
See Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 477-80.
134
See id. at 486–88.
135
See id. at 492–94.
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may differ as to the best way to achieve that goal.136 Ultimately,
the notion that shareholders have homogeneous preferences is a
simplifying assumption that is increasingly under strain.137
The lack of shareholder homogeneity carries two
consequences.
First, the principal arguments for exclusive
shareholder voting are, to put it charitably, less persuasive than
once believed.138 Second, the lack of homogeneity puts pressure
on the way in which the voting mechanism is structured. Of
course, all social choice procedures are intended to work with
diverse preferences. The entire point of most voting systems or
other is to take a set of individual preference profiles and aggregate
them into a group choice (indeed, if preferences were completely
homogeneous, we could just poll one member of the electorate and
skip the rest of the process). We do, however, need to ensure that
the voting structure doesn’t skew in any particular direction.
In the relatively simplified world of corporate elections, taking
care of such a problem is not that difficult. We should not, for
example, be that concerned about skewing a result toward a
minority interest—simple majority votes on the largely binary sets
of alternatives will take care of that. More worrisome is that a
tyrannical majority, temporary or otherwise, will exploit a minority
interest. Most political democracies attempt to blunt the effects of
what the founders called “faction” by making a system of
government less responsive to the electorate and providing
substantive protections to minorities.139 The same approach is
taken in corporate law, where there are many layers between
shareholders and most corporate decisionmaking and various
protections for minority shareholders.140
One thing that’s typically off the table is limiting the voting
rights of a particular group of voters because of the content of their
136

See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the
Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1230-32 (2009).
137
. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 132, at 778 (“It is simply not true that the
‘preferences of [shareholders] are likely to be similar if not identical.’” (quoting
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 405)). See also Hayden & Bodie,
False Promise, supra note 61, at 477-99; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees,
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1052 (1996) (“For fictional shareholders,
whatever else the people behind them may want, all want to maximize the value
of their shares.”).
138
Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 499-504.
139
In the United States, this meant, among other things, dividing the government
into three branches with checks on each other, dividing the federal legislature
into two chambers, and making one of those chambers (the Senate) less
responsive to the people. The substantive protections are embodied in the Bill
of Rights and some of the subsequent amendments to the Constitution.
140
For a discussion of protections for corporate minority shareholders, see
Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119
(2003).
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preferences. It is a fundamental principal of democratic fairness
that people should not be ineligible to vote because of their
opinions.141 This is also consistent with the demands of standard
economics that you take preferences as they come.142 People’s
preferences are supposed to determine market outcomes and be
reflected in institutional decisionmaking rather than the other way
around.143 The function of a voting procedure, for political and
corporate entities, is to aggregate those preferences.
III. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
Critics have assailed the Business Roundtable decision as a
“troubling” effort aimed at “asserting [the judges’] own naked
political preferences.”144 The court imposed a far tougher standard
on the Commission than the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious”
standard would seemingly require.145 However, at the root of the
court’s analysis is a skewed view of the economics underlying the
proposed Rule 14a-11. It is the court’s law and economic analysis,
rather than its application of administrative law, that we intend to
explore in this article.
The Business Roundtable opinion
demonstrates both bad empirical analysis of the underlying costs
and benefits, as well as bad theory about the effect of the rule on
the company and shareholder behavior. These two failings are
discussed in more depth below.
A. Bad Empirics
According to the D.C. Circuit, the SEC had an obligation to
“determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and
to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”146 One of the court’s primary criticisms of the
SEC’s rulemaking on Rule 14a-11 was its supposed failure to
141

U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, XV, and XIX.
See Stephen E. Ellis, Market Hegemony and Economic Theory, 38 PHIL. SOC.
SCI. 513 (2008).
143
See id.
144
Case Comment, supra note 8, at 1095 (saying that the opinion “made
missteps similar to those for which [it] scolded the SEC,” and called it
“troubling”); McDonnell, supra note 8 (“This opinion is little more than the
judges ignoring the proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in
notice-and-comment rulemaking and asserting their own naked political
preferences. Talk about judicial activism.”).
145
See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 8 (noting that “the opinion appears to create
an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide
empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective”).
146
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
142
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demonstrate that the rule was justified by empirical evidence.
According to the court, the Commission had “not sufficiently
supported its conclusion” that the new rule would improve
company performance and shareholder value “[i]n view of the
admittedly (and at best) ‘mixed’ empirical evidence.”147
Commentators have pointed out that this view of the evidence flips
the standard of review on its head, by requiring an agency to
demonstrate conclusively that its regulation will provide more
benefits than costs.148 But on a more fundamental level, the court
misperceives its ability to judge the regulation’s support in the
empirical literature.
According to the court’s analysis, the SEC “relied upon
insufficient empirical data when it concluded that Rule 14a-11 will
improve board performance and increase shareholder value by
facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nominees.”149
However, the court’s own analysis of the empirical data is
extremely cursory, particularly in contrast to that of the
Commission. In its Final Rule, the SEC spends significant time
reviewing a variety of empirical studies that have been conducted
on the issue.150 Indeed, the court itself notes that the Commission
“acknowledged the numerous studies submitted by commenters
that reached the opposite result.”151 However, the court itself cites
to only one of those studies. It then attacks two of the studies that
the Commission did rely on. It again cited to the Commission’s
own acknowledgment, this time that one of the supporting studies
has long-term findings that are “difficult to interpret.”152 Other
than that, the court simply called the two studies “unpersuasive”
and the overall evidence “(at best) mixed” and concluded that the
SEC had “not sufficiently supported its conclusion.”153
The court’s cursory analysis of the empirical debate fails on
many levels. First, it is completely unpersuasive in its attempt to
show that the empirical literature stacked up in opposition to the
rule. The court’s only citation to this opposing literature is to a
report authored by NERA Economic Consulting, on behalf of the
Business Roundtable, in support of the Roundtable’s opposition to

147

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
Case Comment, supra note 8, at 1093-95 (arguing that the court’s opinion
established “unattainable standards” using arbitrary and capricious levels of
review); Zaring, supra note 49 (calling the court’s analysis “the kind of
searching inquiry no agency could survive”).
149
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
150
Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56760-64.
151
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
152
Id. at 1151 (citing Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56760 n.911).
153
Id.
148
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the Rule.154 It is a commissioned document—akin to a legal
brief—submitted to the SEC in support of the Roundtable’s
comments. The court’s sole piece of evidence taken from this
commissioned report is the following claim: “One commenter, for
example, submitted an empirical study showing that ‘when
dissident directors win board seats, those firms underperform peers
by 19 to 40% over the two years following the proxy contest.’”155
The court misstates the evidence. Buckberg and Macey, the
authors of the purported “empirical study,” did not submit an
empirical study of their own. Instead, they simply summarized the
results of three other studies.156 All the data from the three studies
comes from proxy contests that occurred prior to 1990.157 The
market’s perspective on proxy activity has changed significantly
over time, and data from the 1960s and 1970s may well not be
representative of activity twenty-five, thirty, or forty years later.158
Second, these studies vary in terms of their empirical results.
Ikenberry and Lakonishok do find significant negative returns at
24 months when dissidents are successful; however, the negative
results are strongest when dissidents capture a majority of the

154

Elaine Buckberg & Jonathan Macey, Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule
14a-11 on Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Capital Formation in Support of
Comments
by
Business
Roundtable,
(Aug.
17,
2009),
http://www.nera.com/upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf.
155
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (citing Buckberg & Macey, supra note
153, at 9).
156
See Buckberg & Macey, supra note 154, at 9 (citing Lisa F. Borstadt &
Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An
Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance,
FIN. MGMT., Fall 1992; David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate
Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS.
405, 420 (1993); and Michael Fleming, New Evidence on the Effectiveness of the
Proxy Mechanism, (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper No.
9503),
(Mar.
1995),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9503.pdf).
As Steven Davidoff has pointed out: “Ms. Buckberg and Mr. Macey merely
state in their letter that they are summarizing the aggregate results of three other
studies from the early 1990s that examine companies from the 1960s to 1988.
In this light, it is hard to see what the D.C. Circuit’s complaint is since it does
not appear that the judges even looked at these underlying studies to assess their
relevance.” Davidoff, supra note 8.
157
See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 24 (proxy contests from 1962
through 1986); Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 156, at 408 (contests
between 1968 and 1988); Fleming, supra note 156, at 4 (contests from 1977
through 1988).
158
Cf. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 342, 342 (2005) (“The revolution in corporate law has been so thorough
and profound that those working in the field today would have considerable
difficulty recognizing what it was twenty-five to thirty years ago.”).
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board, 159 which cannot happen through Rule 14a-11.160 Borstadt
and Zwirlein, in contrast, find a 28% drop in cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) for dissident victories, but the statistical
significance is low, given the relatively small sample size.161 In
addition, the 24-month point is the nadir; the CAR result improves
to -16% at 36 months. Fleming’s results are significantly more
negative if the dissidents are appointed to their board seats (24.72%) than if the dissidents are elected to their seats (13.95%).162 Fleming also notes that “the removal of a few
observations would be enough to eliminate the statistical
significance in the observed decline.”163 Finally, all three studies
do not see their empirical results as conclusive evidence that proxy
contests destroy firm value. Ikenberry and Lakonishok note that
proxy contests follow a period of deteriorating firm value: the fiveyear growth in these firms’ operating income is 75% below that of
the control firms.164 They find the post-proxy results to be
“unexpected and puzzling,” and note that the evidence “suggests
that shareholders are not rational when they cast their proxies.”165
In the alternative, Ikenberry and Lakonishok hypothesize that
proxy contests may create overoptimism by investors and analysts,
leading to disappointing returns.166 If the firm is worse off than
expected, dissidents may not be able to solve the firm’s significant
problems. This theory is seconded by Borstadt and Zwirlein, who
suggest that “[i]t may be that dissidents are more likely to win
control of firms that are in very bad operating shape,” and that
after they succeed at the ballot box, dissidents may be “little hope
of saving an already sinking ship.”167 Moreover, these results do
not keep Borstadt and Zwirlein being overall sanguine about proxy
contests; they found “positive and significant abnormal returns
realized over the proxy contest period for firms that were not later
taken over.”168 These abnormal gains were not lost in the postcontest period.169
159

Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 156, at 421 (cumulative abnormal return
of -28.6% when dissidents gain at least one seat, versus -41.6% when dissidents
gain control).
160
Rule 14a-11 (limiting the percentage of seats to 25 percent of the seats up for
election, and requiring nominating shareholders to disclaim any interest in
capturing control).
161
Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 29 (“Although the magnitude of the
CAR is large at the annual intervals, the statistical significance is low.”).
162
Fleming, supra note 142, at 17.
163
Id. at 18.
164
Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 156, at 432.
165
Id. at 433.
166
Id. at 433.
167
Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 30.
168
Id. at 31. In fact, the Borstadt and Zwirlein article is cited in a number of
articles as evidence for the positive effects of proxy contests. See Lucian

28

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

The foregoing discussion is meant to demonstrate the
complexities in using this group of empirical studies to enjoin the
SEC’s proxy-access rule. There are questions as to the sample size
of dissident victories; issues of the relevance of proxy battles from
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; and disagreement as to the meaning
of the results that were found. And these are the studies that
Buckberg and Macey relied upon in making the case against proxy
access’s positive impact on firm performance. Other studies,
published in a prestigious peer-review financial journal, have
found that proxy contests increase firm value.170 And regardless of
Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 712 & n.
68 (2007) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the proposition that “empirical
studies consistently found that proxy fights are associated with accompanying
increase in shareholder wealth”); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making
Institutional Activism a Valuable Mechanism for Corporate Governance, 18
YALE J. ON REG. 174, 182 & n.20 (2001) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the
proposition that “proxy fights are not typically waged over marginal matters,
and the empirical literature has consistently identified significant positive wealth
effects from this activity”).
169
Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 31. Fleming similarly found that the
threat of a proxy contest was associated with significant increases in firm value
when the . Fleming, supra note 156, at 10-11 & tbl.4.
170
Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of
Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30 (1989); Peter Dodd &
Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1983); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy
Contests and Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J.
FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998).
Neither the SEC nor the Business Roundtable court discussed a set of
empirical studies designed to test whether the market thought that the SEC’s
proposal was a good idea. Two studies found that markets reacted negatively to
the proposal. See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth
Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Nominations, 46 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS
(forthcoming
2012),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081; David F. Larcker et al., The Regulation of
Corporate Governance (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/The-Regulation-ofCorporate-Governance_Larcker.pdf. However, the methodologies of these
studies have been criticized. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 477 n.254 (“A
combination of problematic coding decisions and confounding events raises
serious doubts about the studies’ empirical claims.”). In addition, another study
that came out after the regulation was enacted but before Business Roundtable
found that firms that would have been most affected by the proxy access rule
lost shareholder value when the SEC decided to delay implementation of the
rule. Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder
Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable
Challenge,
Working
Paper,
Jan.
19,
2012,
at:
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-052.pdf. The study was discussed in late
2010. Steven M. Davidoff, The Heated Debate over Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Nov. 3, 2010, at: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/theheated-debate-over-proxy-access/. There is a meta-analysis question about these
studies, even assuming that one or the other side is correct: namely, why should
we accord special significance to the market’s views at any particular time about
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how these studies shake out, they are all examining something that,
while similar, is not identical to what the SEC is proposing in this
rule. Any study of shareholder-funded proxy challenges is not
directly comparable to Rule 14a-11. So no empirical research of
those proxy contests can be definitive. Moreover, studies that go
beyond proxy contests in the prior century may also be instructive;
what role should they play? Proponents of Rule 14a-11 marshaled
empirical support for increasing shareholder power as a way to
unlock greater share value.171 This body of empirical research is
voluminous compared to the proxy contest studies discussed by the
court, and its findings are arguably more relevant to Rule 14a-11
than the limited proxy contest research.
Respected legal academics have criticized Rule 14a-11 largely
for its ineffectuality.172
Using empirical evidence about
participation and share holdings, they have recounted the
limitations on proxy access through Rule 11—three-percent
ownership for three years—and noted the shallowness of this pool
of potential proxy-access users.173 Moreover, the assumptions
upon which the limitations are based—for example, that longer
term shareholders have a better sense of the company’s interests
over time—have themselves been challenged empirically.174 But
the SEC recognized the limitations of its rule and provided a
justification for the rule’s particular balancing of competing
considerations.175 These normative choices are endemic. For
example, while the three-year rule may seem arbitrary, so would
any rule drawing some line based on the length of the holding. But
the notion that the 2008 financial crisis was caused in part by
short-term profit maximization has received enough academic and
popular support to support policies based on this justification.176
the effects of the rule? Given the timing of these studies and their focus, we do
not fault the SEC for failing to consider them. But see Fisch, supra note 9, at
477-78 (attributing the failure to consider these studies as a potential
“sandbagging” by the SEC of its economic analysis).
171
See Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,761 n.914.
172
Fisch, supra note 9, at 482 (finding that the SEC choose to enact a rule with
“no consequences”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1431-33.
173
Fisch, supra note 9, at 458-66; Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1420-25.
174
See Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity
Returns: Are Short-Term Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 893,
920-22 (2009) (finding that trading activity by short-term institutional investors
provides a reliable forecast of future returns), cited in Fisch, supra note 9, at 464
n.183.
175
Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,688-93.
176
See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 627, 629 (2011) (“Among the competing theories on the cause of the
financial collapse—the over-dependence on derivatives, the overuse of leverage,
the culture of greed and entitlement in the finance industry, just to name a few—
a focus on the short term is an omnipresent narrative thread.”).
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Thus, the fundamental error in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in
Business Roundtable is the presumption that the Commission must
have more than “mixed” empirical research in order to justify its
rule.177 Without the rule being enacted in a parallel universe to
our own, there will never be empirical evidence that is more than
“mixed” on this issue.178 Academics, of course, should delve into
the weeds to determine whether a particular study chose the proper
sample size, controlled for the appropriate variables, and reached
the right conclusions based on the data. But when academics using
proper research methods have come to conflicting conclusions
about empirical results, it is quixotic for agencies and courts to
endeavor to find one true answer. The SEC sorted through the
research to make a case for proxy access while acknowledging the
limitations of that research.179 The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, found
the rule “not sufficiently supported” by the empirical data based on
its own cursory review of a commissioned summary.180 The
contrast is striking.
The Business Roundtable opinion
demonstrates not only a failure to analyze the relevant research,
but also a failure to understand the limits of that research to the
question at hand.
B. Bad Theory
The SEC’s justification for Rule 14a-11 is based partially on
empirics, but mostly on theory. The empirical case, discussed
above,181 is that companies do better when shareholders bring
proxy challenges against underperforming boards. The theory
177

See Davidoff, supra note 8 (“In truth, there is no definitive empirical
evidence on this issue and it is likely will not be any. The issue of how and when
director nominations influence boards is probably impossible to empirically
prove without doubt. But the D.C. Circuit opinion seems to require such
empirical proof.”).
178
One professor supported the rule, insomuch as it would provide data going
forward as to its efficiency. Eric Talley, Proxy Access Forum, CONGLOMERATE
BLOG, (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/08/viewedthrough-the-lens-of-editorial-pages-wednesdays-rule-changewas-a-watershedevent-shareholder-activists-have-been-c.html (“Some rule changes – and
particularly non-voluntary rule changes such as the new Rule 14a-11 – have the
potential merit of creating natural experiments that add to the stock of
information for future researchers, policy makers, regulators and investors. That
dynamic value may justify their adoption in close cases, even if one’s knee-jerk
judgment – based exclusively on currently available static information – would
tilt ambivalently towards preserving the status quo. At the very least, if we’re
genuinely interested in maximizing ‘long term shareholder value’ (a topic that
may be ripe for another debate, another time), the benefit of modest regulatory
experimentation deserves a seat at the prescriptive table.”).
179
See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,760 n.911.
180
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150-51.
181
See part III.A supra.
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behind this empirical evidence is that the board (and its appointed
officers), despite being the elected representatives of the
shareholders, may in fact act in its own interest. Shareholders
suffer agency costs from having a group with potentially differing
concerns make decisions on their behalf.
The ability of
shareholders to choose their representatives is thus critical in
mitigating agency costs.182
In theory, shareholders would enforce their will on their
representatives as most electorates do: through elections.
Shareholders generally vote every year for the entire board.183 If
the directors were acting out of self-interest or doing a poor job
running the company, the shareholders could simply elect a
different set of candidates who would, hopefully, do a better job.
However, it has proven difficult to turn this relatively
straightforward theory into reality. The foundational work of
modern corporate law established the paradigm of separation of
ownership from control: namely, the separation of shareholders
from managers.184 And the basic work of corporate law and
economics further develops these ideas through the concept of the
nexus of contracts and the difficulty of agency costs.185 The
important developments in corporate law theory and practice have
almost all concerned efforts to resolve this tension between
shareholder primacy and managerial control.
Shareholders face several critical challenges in proposing
candidates outside of those nominated by the incumbent board.
First, they face the problem of the commons: any time, money, or
initiative they expend in improving the company will redound to
182

The Delaware Chancery has characterized the right to vote more in terms of
legitimacy than economic efficiency:
The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. . . . It
has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the
stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical
importance. . . . [W]hether the vote is seen functionally as an
unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it
is clear that it is critical to the theory that legitimated the
exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast
aggregations of property that they do not own.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
183
Staggered boards are an exception; directors on staggered boards have twoor three-year terms, and generally are up for reelection on a rotating basis.
184
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932).
185
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 127. See also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW xii (1993) (“Ever since Berle and
Means, the central issue of corporate law has been how to create a legal
structure that monitors management.”).
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the benefit of the whole. If the shareholder owns 100% of the
company, she will capture 100% of the fruits of her labor.
However, if she only owns one percent—a huge sum for most
public companies—she will carry all the costs but only capture one
percent of the benefits. Unless she expects to earn back those
costs, it is economically irrational for the one-percent shareholder
to expend any time or money on improving the company, even if
the overall gains would dwarf the individual costs.186 Second,
shareholders under the current system face much higher costs in
nominating candidates than do the incumbent board members. In
order to run for a director position, any candidate outside of the
board’s official proxy process must essentially create her own
ballots and then provide them to shareholders to use in the voting
process. There is no uniform ballot; instead, “outside” candidates
provide their own proxies and disclose the information required by
federal securities regulation. These substantial costs mean that
most shareholders never nominate candidates, even if those
candidates would be superior directors. The math is simple: the
board gets its proxy ballot paid for by the corporation, but board
opponents do not. That is why proxy ballot access for shareholders
has been on the SEC’s radar screen for most of its existence.
Proxy access reduces the costs of participation, which makes it
more likely that shareholders will participate more actively in
governance. The theory is fairly straightforward.187
How does the Business Roundtable v. SEC opinion refute this
basic economic theory? The court made two counterarguments.
First, it found that the Commission had underappreciated the costs
that incumbent boards would incur in trying to defeat the
“dissident” shareholder nominees. Second, it argued that Rule
14a-11 would cater to union and state pension funds who would

186

To illustrate this: shareholder X owns one percent of Company Y Inc., a
company worth $100 million. If X runs for the board of directors and
implements reforms to the business, Y Inc. will increase in value 20% to $120
million. However, X would only capture $200,000 of those gains. If X’s costs
to secure the seat are more than $200,000, X will not pursue those reforms, even
though the company would increase in value by $20 million.
187
Lee Harris has argued that the results of corporate elections are based not on
the directors’ ability to enhance shareholder value, but rather on their amount
they spend on the campaign. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1782-87 (2011). He maintains that true reform would
require some system of subsidizing campaign expenses for challengers, akin to
public financing for political elections. Id. at 1807; see also Lee Harris,
Shareholder Campaign Funds: A Campaign Subsidy Scheme for Corporate
Elections, 58 UCLA L. REV. 167 (2010). In addition, Yair Listokin has found
an abnormal number of incumbent board victories in his study of close elections,
suggesting some form of advantage for incumbents. Yair Listokin, Management
Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159 (2008).
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use the process to badger for reforms unrelated to overall
shareholder value.
Regarding the incumbent board’s campaign costs, the
Commission recognized that “it can reasonably be expected that
the boards of some companies likely would oppose the election of
shareholder nominees.”188 It also cited to commenters who
suggested that the costs of proxy contests ranged from $800,000 to
$14 million.189 However, the Commission noted that these costs
were not required under Rule 14a-11, and that boards might very
well choose to expend fewer resources. This contention drew the
ire of the court, which found that “the Commission’s prediction
directors might choose not to oppose shareholder nominees had no
basis beyond mere speculation.”190 The court recognized that,
under economic theory, a rational board will forgo an expensive
proxy campaign “if it believes the cost of opposition would exceed
the cost to the company of the board’s preferred candidate losing
the election, discounted by the probability of that happening.”191
However, the court acceded to the logic of the American Bar
Association Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities, which
essentially argued that boards will always have a fiduciary duty to
fiercely oppose shareholder nominees. How so? Well, the
comment argued, if the board determines that the shareholder
nominee is not as good as their nominee, then the board “will be
compelled by its fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to
oppose the nominee.”192 But—of course—in every instance, the
shareholder nominee will be someone who was not chosen by the
board as its nominee. So according to the court, the incumbent
board has a fiduciary duty to campaign vigorously against any and
all “dissident” nominees, since the incumbent nominees will
always be better for the corporation.
At this point it is helpful to take a step back and remind
ourselves of the enterprise. Rule 14a-11 allows shareholders to
save the costs in buying their own proxy materials by using the
company’s proxy materials instead. It thus may facilitate such
nominees and thereby increase their number. But Rule 14a-11
does not change the underlying fact of the elections themselves;
shareholders have always been free to run proxy contests against
the board’s nominees, and the board has always been free to use
the corporate coffers for its campaign—within the limits
188

Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56770.
Id.
190
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
191
Id.
192
Id. (quoting Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of
Securities, Am. Bar Ass’n, to SEC 35 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-456.pdf.
189
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proscribed by fiduciary duty.193 To that extent, the Commission is
correct when it characterizes the costs of campaign as inherent in
the underlying elections required by state corporate law.194
In fact, by making it easier for shareholders to participate in
elections, Rule 14a-11 may, somewhat counter-intuitively,
decrease the number of contested elections. Corporate boards, of
course, never have to wait for disgruntled shareholders to
challenge them in an election. They can, instead, mollify potential
rivals by being more alert and responsive to shareholder concerns
that might prompt a fight. Or boards might opt to include
shareholder nominees on their own slates. Making the corporate
governance system more responsive could very well encourage
self-interested corporate board member—as it has for generations
of politicians—to pay a little closer attention to the desires of the
electorate. And while there might be dangers to an overresponsive
system of governance, that really isn’t of any concern here with the
limitations built into Rule 14a-11 challenges.
And even if corporate management ends up having to deal
with more contested elections under Rule 14a-11, that alone should
not have troubled the court. Focusing on the costs of the election
for the incumbents is like focusing on the costs of political
campaigns to incumbents in assessing whether we want to
facilitate challenges to the incumbents. Electoral campaigns allow
for competition between rival candidates to choose the best
possible nominee. Yes, it would be less costly if we just declared
the incumbent the winner—but that would defeat the point of
having an election in the first place.
Unlike the Commission,195 the court does not endeavor to take
into account the overall costs and benefits of the rule. It instead
simply claims that the Commission failed to take sufficient account
of the costs that incumbent boards would incur in fighting for their
nominees.196 But the court never mentions the much larger
193

According to Delaware law, “where reasonable expenditures are in the
interest of an intelligent exercise of judgment on the part of the stockholders
upon policies to be pursued, the expenditures are proper; but where the
expenditures are solely in the personal interest of the directors to maintain
themselves in office, expenditures made in their campaign for proxies are not
proper.” Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 228
(Del. Ch. 1934). As the court acknowledged in that case, “difficulty is often
bound to arise when it is sought in such cases as this to draw the line between
what is proper and what is improper.” Id. See also Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955).
194
Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,770.
195
Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,754-71.
196
It is not really clear from the opinion what the court actually wanted from the
Commission here.
The court “agree[d] with the petitioners that the
Commission’s prediction directors might choose not to oppose shareholder
nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation.” Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at

2012]

BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE

35

potential benefits that shareholders would get from having more
competitive elections. Shareholders elect directors. It is the key
structural element of shareholder primacy, which is the theoretical
foundation for the law & economics of corporate law. Yet
Business Roundtable v. SEC treats a contested election as a cost to
be borne by the incumbent board, rather than a critical component
of corporate governance.
Let us say it again—shareholder elections have been a
cornerstone not only of corporate law doctrine, but in fact of the
law and economics perspective on corporate law. In order for the
board to align its interests with those of the shareholders, the
electoral process needs to work. Shareholder preferences need to
be meaningfully reflected in electoral outcomes. Law and
economics scholars have worked at designing ways for
shareholders to have a stronger voice in the process in order to
facilitate shareholder wealth maximization. The need for the
incumbent board to protect itself against shareholder insurgents has
never been high on the agenda. The fact that an incumbent board
can reimburse itself at all for its campaign expenses is a somewhat
controversial one.197 Rather than noting that Rule 14a-11 would
reduce costs for shareholders in exercising their right to nominate
candidates, the Business Roundtable court emphasizes the costs
boards will have to expend in fighting them off.
Why does the court reject basic economic theory in favor of
supporting incumbent boards? Perhaps because the court is
predisposed to think that the shareholder nominees who will take
advantage of Rule 14a-11 deserve to be defeated. In our view, the
crux of the court’s opinion is its section on “Shareholders with
Special Interests”—namely, “unions and state and local
governments whose interests in jobs may well be greater than their
interests in share value.”198 Because of their “special” interests,
the court fears that such shareholders will use Rule 14a-11 to
“pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal of
maximizing shareholder value, and will likely cause companies to
incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.”199
1150. However, the Commission suggested this was a mitigating possibility; it
did not suggest that incumbent boards would forego proxy campaigns. Instead,
the Commission only argued that the costs might be limited. Final Rule, supra
note 4, at 56,770. Although the court cited the petitioners’ claim that the failure
to estimate the exact costs of such campaigns was arbitrary, the court did not
specifically endorse this claim. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
197
See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 182 (2003) (“. . .[A]uthorizing
the board to expend corporate funds on its own re-election seems to permit a
kind of self-dealing.”).
198
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151-52.
199
Id. at 1152.
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The court accused the Commission of acting arbitrarily by
“ducking serious evaluation of the costs that could be imposed . . .
by shareholders representing special interests.”200
For a court that had earlier been so concerned with empirical
support, the claim that union and pension fund shareholders will
use their shares to pursue special interests is laughably lacking. As
its authority, the court cites to the comments from the Business
Roundtable itself, which provides the following quote: “[S]tate
governments and labor unions . . . often appear to be driven by
concerns other than a desire to increase the economic performance
of the companies in which they invest.”201 The quote is taken from
an article by the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.202
The article does not provide a footnote for this statement, and there
is no authority presented in support. The claim itself is rather
couched, qualified by “often” and “appears to be.” In fact, the
Chancellor’s entire article is not written as his own views, but
rather as a missive based upon a fictionalized perspective of an
“open-minded corporate law ‘traditionalist.’”203 As Chancellor
Strine emphasizes, “[t]hat viewpoint should not be confused as
representing my own.”204 Regardless of whether this is meant to
present an unreliable narrator,205 it certainly makes the article an
exercise in rhetoric. It seems fairer to say that Chancellor Strine’s
statement is something that the “traditionalist” would believe—not
necessarily something grounded in demonstrated reality.206 The
use of “appears to be” echoes this notion.
The bogeyman of unions and pension funds running amok is
popular in a certain segment of corporate law literature.207
200

Id.
Id. (citing Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the Proposed
Election Contest Rules and the Proposed Amendment to the Shareholder
Proposal
Rules
102
(August
17,
2009),
available
at
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/hearingsletters/downloads/BRT_Commen
t_Letter_to_SEC_on_File_No_S7-10-09.pdf ).
202
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006). At the time, Chancellor Strine was a vicechancellor.
203
Id. at 1759.
204
Id.
205
See, e.g., AGATHA CHRISTIE, THE MURDER OF ROGER ACKROYD (1926).
206
See also J. Robert Brown, Shareholder Access and Uneconomic Economic
Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC, DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE, Sept. 30,
2011,
at:
http://www.denverlawreview.org/practitionerspieces/2011/9/30/shareholder-access-and-uneconomic-economic-analysisbusiness.html (noting that Chancellor Strine “was commenting on differences
among shareholders, not the use of access”).
207
See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2008) (“Public employee pension funds are
vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing political/social goals of the
201
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However, it is similarly unsubstantiated there. The most common
example of “special” shareholders using their power to affect firm
governance—in a way that harms other shareholders—is the
campaign by CalPERS and the United Food and Commercial
Workers (UFCW) to withhold shareholder support for certain
Safeway directors.208 The campaign allegedly targeted these
directors because of Safeway’s hard-line negotiations with the
UFCW. In the end, however, only seventeen percent of the shares
voted against the targeted directors.209
The CalPERS-Safeway example has been used over and over
to demonstrate the potential for unions and pension funds to
pressure boards into caving to labor demands.210 But the example
itself demonstrates the lack of such potential. CalPERS and the
other pension funds involved had legitimate corporate governance
concerns to raise along with their union-oriented concerns; they
did not nakedly assert nonshareholder interests.211 Indeed, why
fund trustees that are unrelated to shareholder interests generally.”); Joseph A.
Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and
Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 378-83 (2010) (singling out labor unions and public
pension funds a special-interest shareholders); Romano, supra note 153, at 23132 (arguing that union and public pension fund managers use shareholder
proposals to accrue “private benefits”); Larry Ribstein, The “Shareholder
Democracy”
Scam,
IDEOBLOG,
(Oct.
27,
2006),
at
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the_shareholder.html (“It should
be obvious to anybody who cares to look past the rhetoric that the unions are
seeking bargaining leverage on behalf of their members, and to ensure their own
survival. They are not seeking to represent the interests of investors
generally.”); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political
Economy, in Delaware and Washington, Working Paper, Nov. 20, 2011, at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884110
(referring
to
“agenda-driven activists, such as CalPERS and other state pension funds, as
having pernicious and costly side-agendas” apart from those of “financial”
shareholders).
208
See Grundfest, supra note 207, at 382-83.
209
Id. at 383. Moreover, the directors would have still been reelected, even if a
majority had voted to withhold their votes.
210
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 207, at 229; Anabtawi, supra note 117, at 589-90;
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1285-86 (2008); Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and
the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 883
(2010); Grundfest, supra note 207, at 382-83; John F. Olson, Reflections on a
Visit to Leo Strine’s Peaceable Kingdom, 33 J. CORP. L. 73, 76-77 (2007); Mark
J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2524-25 (2005); J.W.
Verret, Defending against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future
Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391,
397 (2011); David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund
Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031,
2071 (2010).
211
Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Withhold Votes on Safeway CEO, L.A. TIMES,
April 8, 2004, at: http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/08/business/fi-calpers8
(“CalPERS said it would withhold its votes for Safeway Chairman and Chief

38

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

would they?—they were also shareholders. Their exercise of
power netted only seventeen percent of the total shareholder vote,
and also led to the ouster of the CalPERS chair who had
orchestrated the campaign.212 The situation was, in fact, a total
catastrophe for CalPERS. It is hardly evidence that unions and
pension funds will exercise their ballot box power to crush their
fellow shareholders.
Moreover, beyond this anecdote, the
evidence is that union and pension fund shareholders have been
aligned with their fellow shareholders in seeking corporate
governance reforms.213
There’s a reason why “special interest” shareholders have
supported reforms that support overall shareholder value rather
than their special interests: they would not otherwise be enacted.
Efforts by one group of shareholders to elect a director that would
cater to their unique interests would be met with indifference or
hostility from their fellow shareholders. The Business Roundtable
court fails to explain how union and pension fund shareholders
could ever use Rule 14a-11 to elect special-interest directors
without majority support. The numbers do not add up. There are
only two alternatives: (1) that shareholders will irrationally vote
against their interests, or (2) special-interest candidates will
consistently lose. The court presents no theory as to an irrational
Executive Steven Burd because of a 60% drop in Safeway's stock since early
2001 that the pension fund said wiped out $20 billion in market value. CalPERS
officials also cited what they described as conflicts of interest and a lack of
responsiveness to shareholder concerns.”).
212
Tom Petruno, Business Applauds Shake-Up at CalPERS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2004, at A1.
213
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019-20 (1998)
(“In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are
doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large
institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital.”). One empirical
study has found that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are more likely to support
director nominees by the incumbent board once the AFL-CIO no longer
represents workers at a given firm.
Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders, REV. FIN. STUD.
(forthcoming), at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1285084.
Agrawal argues that this divergence represents governance objectives that are
“motivated by worker interests rather than equity value maximization alone.”
Id. at 2. The study focused on the split between the AFL-CIO and the Change to
Win coalition of unions, and examined the behavior of AFL-CIO funds with
respect to directors at Change to Win companies. Id. at 3-4, 7-8. Overall,
Agrawal found that the AFL-CIO funds voted for director nominees 65% of the
time and a Change to Win union (the Carpenters) voted 75% of the time, while
three different index funds supported the director nominees between 89%–98%
of the time. Id. at 35 tbl. 1. Agrawal assumes, however, that the index funds’
votes reflect a policy of shareholder wealth maximization. He does not
demonstrate why a vote for incumbent directors equals a vote for shareholder
wealth maximization; it could, in fact, represent the opposite.
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electorate, but does contend that a corporation may incur costs
even without shareholder victories. It raises the specter of a board
“succumbing to the demands, unrelated to increasing value, of a
special interest shareholder threatening to nominate a director.”214
However, it cites no instances of such a power play, nor does it
explain why in theory a board would cave. The court also notes
that special-interest shareholders “will likely cause companies to
incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.”215
However, the court does not explain why shareholders would send
up nominees unlikely to be elected, other than to impose costs
(which is, of course, against all shareholder interests, including
their own). Although Rule 14a-11 reduces the costs of nominating
director candidates, it does not eliminate them entirely, and it
would be economically irrational for special-interest shareholders
to incur repeated nomination costs if the result is consistent
electoral defeat.216
Thus, the court’s decision in Business Roundtable rests on
economic theory that: (a) discounts the importance of the
shareholder vote in corporate governance; (b) looks only at the
campaign costs to incumbents when calculating the overall
214

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.
Id.
216
Joseph Grundfest has provided a theory (unmentioned by the court) arguing
that union and pension fund shareholders could use Rule 14a-11 as a
“megaphone” to get across their message and, in some cases, secure concessions
from sensitive boards. Grundfest, supra note 207, at 378-83. Grundfest asserts
that these shareholders can use the nomination process to gain additional
publicity “at very little cost” and “need not even come close to winning.” Id. at
379. He cites to the “significant press coverage” that the first proxy access
candidates will get, or that will accrue to those candidates touting “controversial
or novel proposals.” We think that this concern is overstated and, at best, shortterm. It would eventually be self-defeating. However, it is instructive (and
perhaps eye-opening) to see the parade of horribles that Grundfest trots out:
215

Consider a board candidate who wants to limit the export of
jobs to foreign factories, or to close down foreign factories in
order to bring manufacturing jobs back to America. Consider a
candidate who wants to cap all executive salaries at a multiple
of the average hourly wage of the rank and file. Consider a
candidate who wants the company voluntarily to comply with
emissions standards that reduce global warming but that place
the corporation at a competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace.
Id. at 381. Grundfest also alludes to the possibility that “eggshell directors” will
collapse under the pressure of a dissident campaign and offer meaningful
concessions to make the campaign go away. Id. at 382-83. His only example is
Safeway—a failure—and his theory requires that directors will act irrationally to
stave off some level of PR discomfort. Perhaps such eggshells should not be on
the board to begin with.
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efficiency of the shareholder franchise; (c) assumes directors will
act irrationally in the face of challenges; and (d) assumes “specialinterest” shareholders will irrationally waste their own and the
corporation’s money in pursuit of fruitless campaigns. This
collection of theories departs dramatically from the standard law
and economics of corporate law, which assumes that shareholders
and directors will act rationally, that agency costs are a natural
byproduct of the separation of ownership and control, and that the
shareholder franchise will increase overall efficiency.217 Why does
the Business Roundtable court—a court that ostensibly seeks to
vindicate law and economics principles in its decision—depart so
dramatically from law and economics foundations? The next
section offers our theory.
IV. Business Roundtable and the Purpose of Democracy
Business Roundtable reveals just how far a sect of law and
economics adherents has drifted from its own basic precepts. They
actually distrust a more robust corporate democracy because the
electoral outcomes are more likely to reflect underlying
shareholder preferences. In a world of stifled democracy,
theoreticians can make judgments about what the People would
“really” want if they were freely able to express those preferences.
So it was with the law and economics of corporate law: the “nexus
of contract” theory was used to justify the existence of certain
contractual features in the corporate landscape, while the
“hypothetical contract” was used to justify the mandatory, noncontractual foundations.218 Similarly, the notion of “shareholder
homogeneity” enabled corporate law theorists to speak broadly
about what shareholders (as a whole) would want.219 If all
shareholders are the same—or, at least, want the same things out of
their shares—then the vote itself becomes almost secondary.

217

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 66-72 (defending the
shareholder franchise); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 102, at 441 (finding
that “as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on a
consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social
welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder
interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests”).
218
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the
Unraveling of “Nexus of Contract” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1131-32
(2011) (reviewing LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION
(2010)).
219
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 70 (emphasizing that
shareholders are likely to have “similar if not identical” interests because “the
shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a reasonably homogenous
group”).
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As has become increasingly clear, however, shareholders are
not homogenous.220 A variety of different shareholder “types”—
majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting
rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged
shareholders,
government
shareholders,
employee
and
management shareholders—have unique interests apart from their
shareholder compadres.221 Moreover, shareholders differ with
respect to their definition of wealth maximization. A hedge fund
looking for a quick return is different than an index fund looking to
stay in the stock as long as it is listed. A shareholder seeking to
maximize the value of this individual stock is different than a
portfolio investor.222 Shareholders might have conflicting opinions
as to business and strategic decisions that shape the corporation’s
present and future.223 And the notion that shareholders have a
shared interest in wealth maximization is a simplifying
assumption. Shareholders are heterogeneous with respect to their
utility preferences in that these preferences do not match up
directly with wealth. Shareholders – when assessed as individual
people – all have individual utility preferences that go beyond
maximization of one’s wealth.224
When scholars hold forth that special interest shareholders
may advance goals that are unrelated to “shareholder interests
generally,” they put the cart before the horse. The concept itself—
“shareholder interests generally”—has no meaning until the
preferences of actual shareholders are aggregated through some
electoral process. It’s a mistake to think that any one version of
shareholder wealth maximization has priority over all the others.
It’s a bigger mistake for a court to adopt that singular version and
enforce it. And it’s simply bad economics to ignore large swaths
220

Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 477-98.
Id. at 477-92.
222
Some commentators have suggested a normative system of portfolio wealth
maximization, rather than share wealth maximization. Robert G. Hansen &
John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with
Diversified Shareholders/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 43, 44
(1996). See also Greenwood, supra note 137, at 1056 (discussing the
differences between the “corporate law” fictional shareholder and the “portfolio
investor” shareholder).
223
For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders recently battled over the wisdom
of the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. Michael Brick & Steve
Lohr, Fiorina Claims Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
March 19, 2002. Hewlett-Packard director Walter Hewlett battled the rest of the
company’s board and management over the merger, ultimately losing in a close
election. Both sides agreed that the merger should be judged on its impact of
Hewlett-Packard’s success, but they disagreed about whether the merger would
help accomplish that goal. Hewlett and the company spent an estimated $100
million in their efforts to persuade shareholders. Id.
224
For an in-depth discussion of the role of efficiency in the law and economics
of corporate law, see Hayden & Ellis, supra note 50.
221
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of individual preferences when they don’t comply with a particular
vision of the corporation. Standard economics instructs us to take
preferences as they come. In almost every other situation, law and
economics scholars positively fetishize individual preferences;
here, they run away from them. Simple reflection should reveal
that, when it comes down to it, there aren’t any shareholders who
seek to advance “shareholder interests generally.” That, after all,
is the board’s job, and the way to keep it on task is to ensure that
the election process is at least somewhat responsive to actual
shareholders.
Of course, if there is no avenue for expressing these diverse
preferences, there is no evidence of them on display. In closelyheld corporations, shareholders’ preferences conflict on a variety
of levels: dividends, mergers, director seats, employment positions,
and business plans. And these preferences play out in shareholder
votes and board meetings. But the separation of ownership from
control in public corporations has meant that the shareholder
franchise is effectively irrelevant.225 If shareholders cannot
efficiently mount opposition campaigns for director positions,
these elections become exercises in rubber stamping. Rule 14a-11
was an attempt to break out of this dysfunctional pattern. It
endeavored to reduce the costs of competing for directorships, and
thereby encourage more candidates to enter the race.
We know from our basic review of preference aggregation that
there are many ways in which a voting system can fall short of its
goal of producing outcomes that meaningfully reflect the desires of
relevant constituents.226 Sometimes there are barriers, both subtle
and obvious, that prevent interested parties from voting.
Sometimes the system assigns weight to votes in a way that skews
outcomes in a particular direction. Sometimes votes are combined
in ways that thwart the ability of certain groups of voters to have
an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. And,
in some cases, voters are hindered in their ability to get their
preferred candidates on the ballot during the slating process. A
defect in any aspect of a voting system has the ability to distort the
preference aggregating function of an election.
Here, even if contemporary corporate governance gets some
things right (perhaps, for example, “one share, one vote” properly
captures both the identity and proper weighting of corporate votes),
it may still fall short when it comes to the slating process. A
slating process that unduly restricts the ability of candidates to
make it onto a ballot is, generally, a problem.227 And when one of
225

Bebchuk, supra note 168, at 682-94 (describing the lack of effective
shareholder voting power).
226
See Part II, supra pages xx-xx.
227
See Hall, supra note 88.
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the principal justifications for that restriction is based on the
content of voter preferences, as it is in the case of “special interest”
shareholders, we can be certain that the results will be skewed in a
certain direction, distorting the preference aggregating function of
the electoral process. In the political realm, we saw that the
Supreme Court sometimes viewed political stability in the form of
preserving the two-party system as an acceptable (though not
uncontroversial) goal of state ballot access laws.228 But the
existing scheme of corporate governance—the one that Rule14a-11
was designed to modify—is nowhere close to suffering from the
kind of unsteadiness that might justify more restrictive access to
the corporate ballot. Indeed, the current system has all the stability
(and democratic fairness) of a one-party state.
Which brings us to a little secret about those law and
economics adherents who believe in shareholder homogeneity:
they do not want real shareholder democracy. Shareholder wealth
maximization is a fictional placeholder developed to replace the
actual interests of the shareholders.229 If shareholders truly
expressed their preferences through their votes, there would be no
need for the norm of residual maximization. Instead, the board and
management would be expected to follow the actual preferences of
shareholders, rather than simply a presumed wealth maximization
preference. Thus, we see the strange cycle that justifies the current
stasis in shareholder democracy. Shareholders, we are told, will
single-mindedly focus on increasing the residual as their sole
preference for corporate policy. Because it is in the interests of all
corporate stakeholders that the residual be maximized, we should
give power to those who have a single-minded focus on such an
outcome.230 However, actual shareholders may not all agree on
one homogenized goal. If let loose to express their actual
preferences, shareholders might express their preferences for a
variety of interests beyond shareholder wealth maximization.231
Because shareholder preferences are irrelevant to shareholder
primacy, true shareholder democracy is actually a threat to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm.
The Business Roundtable decision neatly illustrates this
hostility. In its review of the Commission’s cost-benefit analysis,
the court agreed that Rule 14a-11 “will mitigate collective action
228
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and free rider concerns, which can discourage a shareholder from
exercising his right to nominate a director in a traditional proxy
contest, and has the potential of creating the benefit of improved
shareholder value.”232 But the opinion never returned to these
notions. Instead, it turned to the concrete costs of democracy for
the incumbent board: namely, the costs of engaging in a
meaningful board election, and the potential for “special”
shareholders to abuse their right to enter elections.233 From the
court’s perspective, democracy is a messy, expensive process in
which outsiders may crash the party and ruin the whole thing. The
Commission’s failure to recognize this was, in the court’s view,
arbitrary and capricious.
But, of course, democracy is messy. Most, if not all, of us
have been disappointed by its results at various points in our lives.
Some corporate law scholars have argued that democracy should
have only a minimal role to play in corporate governance, and that
directors should have the authority of Platonic guardians over their
shareholder subjects.234 However, mainstream law and economics
has long defended the critical role of shareholder democracy
within the overall framework of corporate governance.235
Shareholders need to hold directors accountable for failing to
pursue shareholder interests. Otherwise, the corporation will be
riven with agency costs.
The split between the ideas of shareholder wealth
maximization and shareholder preference aggregation has led to
the current split in the law and economics academy. One side
maintains its faith that facilitating shareholder democracy will
232
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increase corporate efficiency and reduce overall agency costs.236
The other side now trusts the hypothetical shareholder more than
actual shareholders when it comes to pursuing shareholder wealth
maximization. Private equity funds which seek to buy out
shareholders at a premium are to be encouraged. But shareholders
within the company who want to exercise their democratic
privileges are simply troublemakers. The D.C. Circuit has placed
itself firmly in the second camp—and, we believe, inappropriately
so.
CONCLUSION
Corporate law and economics scholarship has become adept at
containing and eliding certain contradictions as to its basic
principles. Corporations are contracts, except when they’re not.237
Shareholders all have the same interests, except when they
don’t.238 And shareholder voting maximizes utility, except when it
doesn’t.239 The analysis in Business Roundtable provides a shoddy
and simplified reflection of these principles; it should perhaps not
be surprising that the contradictions therefore appear a bit more
obvious.
It is one thing for scholars to debate contested issues using
rival theories and indeterminate empirical data. It is quite another
for the judiciary to strike down a regulation—one specifically
endorsed by statute—based on one side’s version of the theory and
data. The Business Roundtable decision has ensconced a bad
version of corporate law and economics into the Federal Reporters.
And we fear that, unless it is corrected over time, this bad law and
economics will cow regulatory agencies, particularly the SEC, into
adhering to a crabbed and inchoate vision of corporate governance.
Hopefully, criticism of the opinion will demonstrate that the
court’s errors need not be replicated by others.
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